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-------------------------------------------- ABSTRACT --------------------------------------------- 
 
Despite the many and highly publicised failures of the EU to agree in the field of foreign 
and  security  policy,  the  EU  members  have  gradually  and  successively  developed  their 
cooperation in this area over time. By focusing not primarily on the absence (or failure) of a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) between the EU members, but rather on the 
successively intensified cooperation since 1970, and asking for possible explanations, this paper 
shows that realism can offer a component to the analysis of the CFSP that has often been 
overlooked by realist scholars themselves. By (re)interpreting the centuries-old balance-of-
power  thesis,  seeing it as a mechanism through which states will strive for international 
influence rather than power in its purely material sense, this study shows the continued 
relevance of certain realist wisdom. One very important part of the history of the CFSP 
turns out to be a history of trying to collectively balance US influence, primarily in other 
parts of the world. And, while it is indeed – as any realist would point out – difficult to 
cooperate in the high politics sphere, it is precisely this “balance-of-influence” logic that 
explains  why  the  CFSP  (as  well  as  its  predecessor  EPC)  nonetheless  has  developed 
remarkably  over  time.  As  shown  in  this  paper,  the  CFSP  has  repeatedly  intensified 
following transatlantic disagreements, primarily over international security management. 
Therefore, while successive institutional changes have locked in this stepwise development, 
this “cycle” of intensified foreign and security policy cooperation has been repeatedly set in 
motion by diplomatic quarrels across the Atlantic. 
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Balancing Global Influence 
 
 
 
Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form 
if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that 
Europe does not make even approximately the defense efforts of 
which it is capable. But European unity is stymied, and domestic 
politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The 
result is a massive frustration which express itself in special testiness 
toward the United States. 
 
Henry A. Kissinger, 1968 
 
 
Most of us would prefer to be called an “ally” or a “partner” than  
a “tool” in a box. 
 
Javier Solana, 2003 
 
 
 
Since their first meeting within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework in 
1970,  the  EU  members  have  successively  intensified  their  foreign  policy  cooperation. 
Gradually, the Union has become an actor in its own right in international politics. In 
1980, after a decade of cooperation, the Nine had grown into a habit of addressing some 
ten fairly nearby “problem countries” a year, attempting to influence the situation towards 
more  peaceful  and  democratic  societies.  By  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  after  another 
twenty years of cooperation, the European Union was regularly addressing the situation in 
over 60 countries every year, all around the world, on a multitude of issues relating to 
security in a broad sense. Both carrots and sticks – political as well as economic – were 
increasingly used on a regular basis.
1 Another five years on, the Union had also deployed 
uniformed and armed personnel in several places in both Europe and Africa.
2  
How can this development be explained? Why – despite obvious problems, as last seen 
in relation to the Iraq war in 2003 – are we witnessing a successive evolution of the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy, which now also includes the European security and 
defence policy?  
Cooperation for power and influence 
One of the most plausible explanations for the successive evolution of the CFSP has been 
suggested by Michael E. Smith, who argues that this development is closely tied to the 
                                                     
1 See graphs in appendix. 
2 By the end of January 2005, the EU had initiated (and in some case already terminated) seven crisis management 
missions, of which six were military missions or police missions.   – 4 – 
successive institutional development over time. In something of a cyclical development, 
improved  institutions  have  repeatedly  generated  intensified  policy,  which  in  turn  has 
generated  new  demands  for  improved  institutions.
3  However,  when  contrasting  the 
institutional development  of the EPC/CFSP  with a systematic  study of the changes in 
policy  content  (quantitatively  and  qualitatively)  over  time,  the  time  lags  between  the 
events suggest that it is only the “second half” of this cycle that is repeatedly visible in the 
history  of  EU  foreign  policy.  While  institutional  changes  have  indeed  followed  policy 
changes, and thereby constantly locked in the achievements on new and higher levels, the 
changes  in  institutional  arrangements  seem  rarely  to  have  generated  immediate  policy 
changes.
4 Unless  constantly allowing for quite long time-lags between  the institutional 
changes and the possible effects on policy (which is not an entirely improbable idea, but 
not further pursued here), it seems that there might be other forces at work that set off the 
periods of increasing foreign policy cooperation in the first place. 
Something else needs to be added to the analysis, and one plausible place to start would 
be to ask whether any recurring events or changes in the external environment may have 
preceded the changes in the EPC/CFSP over time. And, one of the most intuitive places to 
look  for  propositions  of  that  type  would  be  among  scholars  writing  within  the  realist 
tradition. As one student of international relations has pointed out, even “writers who are 
concerned principally with international institutions and rules, or analysts in the Marxist 
tradition, make use of some Realist premises.”
5 In the following, it will be argued that a 
closer look – or, rather, a different look – at some realist propositions reveals that there is 
indeed one type of recurring event that seems to work as a catalyst, repeatedly setting off a 
new cycle in the development of the CFSP. 
Cooperation as a balancing strategy 
Realists are not optimists about the possibilities for states to cooperate. The well-known 
assumptions  underlying  most  realist  analyses  lead  to  the  propositions  that  states  are 
predisposed toward conflict and competition, and that international institutions have only 
marginal possibilities to mitigate these effects of anarchy.
6 Conflict, not cooperation, is 
something of a default situation in international politics. 
Nonetheless,  states  are  sometimes  found  to  cooperate,  and  mainstream  realist 
frameworks offer two possible ways to account for this rare event. One possibility is that 
cooperation  is  imposed  by  one  participating  and  specifically  powerful  actor,  or,  as  Robert 
Keohane  puts  it,  that  “the  formation  of  international  regimes  normally  depend  on 
hegemony.”
7  This  is  obviously  not  a  possible  explanation  for  the  increasingly  active 
                                                     
3 Smith, M.E. 2004. 
4 Strömvik, forthcoming 2005. 
5 Keohane 1989, p. 35; cf. Jervis 1999, p. 44f. 
6 Grieco 1990, p. 4.  
7 Keohane 1984, p. 31. See for instance Krasner 1976, p. 322ff., for an account of how the “hegemonic stability 
thesis” may account for cooperation in the field of international political economy. See for instance Bull 1971, p. 144, 
for a similar argument related to cooperation in the security policy field, within for instance NATO. Bull argued that 
since the US “enjoys a position of leadership or primacy, certain conflicts within this alliance are kept within bounds or 
prevented from reaching the surface of conscious political activity.”   – 5 – 
cooperation within the CFSP, and this ‘hegemonic stability thesis’ will therefore not be 
discussed further in this paper.  
The other possibility is that states may choose cooperation as a strategy to balance one 
specifically powerful actor. This way of interpreting the ‘balance of power thesis,’ however, 
requires  a  few  clarifications.
8  The  concept  of  balancing is  quite  simply used  here  as  a 
synonym to an attempt to alter the balance between one’s own power relative to someone else’s 
power. In this respect, “balancing” is seen as a strategy that may be chosen by one actor 
alone or collectively by a number of actors, although it is the latter situation that is of 
interest in this paper.  
The  concept  of  power  is  however  somewhat  more  problematic.  Provided  that  this 
‘realist’ proposition about cooperation has any explanatory power for the CFSP, what type 
of power it is that we should expect the EU to balance? Depending on how we define 
power in this context, we will also arrive at very different expectations about when the 
EU’s foreign policy cooperation should intensify. 
Power over resources 
One  useful  distinction  between  three  overarching  ways  to  conceive  of  power  in 
international politics has been proposed by Jeffrey Hart, who argues that a distinction can 
be made between power over resources, power over another actor, and power over events 
and outcomes.
9 To ascribe an actor power in accordance with its power over resources or 
capabilities  is  probably  one  of  the  most  common  usages  of  the  concept  of  power  in 
traditional IR-literature.
10 For instance, Kenneth Waltz  argues  that  the most powerful 
states are those that score highest “on all of the following items: size of population and 
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability 
and  competence.”
11  Within  this  conception  of  power,  capabilities  are  thus  normally 
interpreted as material (and sometimes also non-material) assets, although views differ on 
which types of resources are the most important ones.
12 More often than not, however, 
military power is seen as the most important asset.
13 
To balance such power, then, would primarily involve attempts at increasing one’s own 
material assets, measured against someone else’s assets. Cooperation as a balancing strategy 
would, consequently, primarily be about collective attempts at increasing certain material 
assets. Therefore, if it had been this type of power – and this type only – that states were 
assumed  to  balance  (which  is  indeed  the  idea  put  forward  by  for  instance  Waltz),  a 
collective  foreign  policy  would  clearly  not  be  the  most  obvious  response.  Within  this 
interpretation of the balance-of-power thesis, it would in fact be easier to see for instance 
                                                     
8 For two accounts of the various uses of the balance-of-power concept, see Haas 1953 and Sheehan 1996. 
9 Hart 1976. 
10 Hart 1976, p. 289; Goldmann 1979, p. 15; Jönsson 1979, p. 64. Many also make interesting and highly relevant 
distinctions  between  resources  and  capabilities,  but  in  the  context  of  this  chapter  such  distinctions  are  not  of 
immediate importance. 
11 Waltz 1979, p. 131. 
12  For  just  a  small  sample  of  different  interpretations,  see  for  instance  Morgenthau  1949/1967,  Ch.  9;  Bull 
1977/1995, Ch. 9; Gilpin 1981; Rosecrance 1986; Nye 1990; Rosecrance 1999; and Mearsheimer 2001. 
13 For a number of examples, see Rothgeb 1993, p. 7f.   – 6 – 
the common commercial policy or even the Lisbon process as a balancing strategy than the 
CFSP. Therefore, this conception of power is not of particular interest to this study. 
Power over another actor 
The second way to conceive of power is probably the most familiar one in other areas of 
political science than international relations, and requires an explicit relationship between 
two or more actors. In Robert Dahl’s well-known formulation, “A has power over B to the 
extent  that  he  can  get  B  to  do  something  that  B  would  not  otherwise  do.”
14  In  this 
conception, actor A has power over actor B in some particular respect, which also requires 
power to bring about the desired act from B. This conception of power is not entirely 
absent in IR writings, and is reflected for instance in Samuel Huntington’s definition of 
power  in  international  politics  as  “the  ability  of  one  actor,  usually  but  not  always  a 
government, to influence the behavior of others, who may or may not governments.”
15  
Most typical, this is also the view of power that is reflected in the balance-of-threat 
thesis.  Adding  the  assumption  that  the  balancing  is  undertaken  in  relation  not  only 
towards a specific actor, but towards a threatening one at that, the proponents of this 
thesis argue that rising or overwhelming material power alone is not enough of a threat to 
trigger a balancing behaviour.  Power capabilities will not  trigger a balancing behaviour 
unless they are also offensive, and unless the unit who possesses them is perceived to be 
aggressive or expansionist.
16  
The balancing is thereby assumed to be undertaken by increasing one’s own resources in 
relation  to  one  specifically  threatening  actor.  Such  balancing  is  often  carried  out  by 
military means, but Stephen Walt also detects a second possibility – that such balancing 
may instead be “conducted by political means.”
17 Consequently, cooperation as a balancing 
strategy may, in this interpretation, materialise in the form of a military or political alliance 
“against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat.”
18 In line with this reasoning, we 
should expect the attempts at balancing to be particularly intense during periods when this 
foreign  power  behaves  particularly  threatening.  Thereby,  and  in  contrast  to  the  first 
conception of power, this way of defining power does provide a testable proposition about 
the development of the EPC/CFSP. The EPC/CFSP should have taken new steps during 
periods when the Soviet Union behaved particularly offensive during the Cold War, and 
(although  arguably  more  difficult  to  sustain)  during  periods  when  Russia  has  swayed 
towards a more conflictual language and behaviour towards the West after the Cold War.  
When contrasting the  changes in Soviet/Russian foreign policy since 1970 with  the 
changes in the EPC/CFSP activities, however, there seems to be no link at all between the 
two.
19 Therefore, while providing an interesting question, this conception of power does 
                                                     
14 Dahl, 1957, pp. 202-203. 
15 Huntington 1993, p. 68. 
16 Walt 1987, p. 22, 26, 149, 169. 
17 Walt 1987, p. 22, 26, 149, 169. 
18 Walt 1987, p. 21. 
19 Strömvik, forthcoming 2005.   – 7 – 
not provide a fruitful answer to the question about possible external forces behind the 
development of the CFSP. The common foreign and security policy seems not to develop 
primarily as a response to a common threat. 
Power over events, and an overlooked ‘balance-of-influence’ thesis 
This leaves us with the third conception of power – the power over events and outcomes. 
Jeffrey  Hart  advocates  this  view  of  power  as  the  most  fruitful  in  the  analysis  of 
international  relations,  because  “unless  the  actors  regard  control  over  other  actors  or 
resources as valuable in themselves, then the ability to control actors and resources will be 
considered secondary to the ability to control events.”
20 This way of conceiving of power 
can also be found in IR writings. For instance, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul define 
a  great  power  as  a  country  “possessing  the  will  and  the  capability  to  alter  events 
throughout the international system.”
21 In this respect, ‘power’ equals what some have 
rather termed ‘influence.’ Karl Deutsch’s argument that power may be thought of as “a 
symbol of the ability to change the distribution of results”
22 is for instance quite similar to 
Paul Light’s definition of influence as “the ability to change outcomes from what they 
would have been.”
23 This conception of power also seems to fit well with Fareed Zakaria’s 
preferred assumption that states, rather than necessarily striving to maximise power in a 
materialist sense, are inclined to seek to maximise influence.
24  
It seems, however, that this view of power has rarely, if ever, been explicitly used by 
analysts  interested  in  the  balance-of-power  thesis.  The  balancing  should,  with  this 
conception  of  power,  equal  attempts  at  increasing  one’s  own  ability  to  influence 
international events, in relation to the actor in the system that has the greatest ability to 
influence events. Consequently, cooperation as a balancing strategy should be interpreted as 
an attempt to collectively increase - in relation to the most influential actor - the ability to 
influence events and outcomes.
25  
This also leads to a proposition about when we should find variation in the levels of 
cooperation. The perceived gains from cooperation should be most visible during times 
when  the  most  influential  actor  pursues  policies  that  the  potentially  balancing  states 
disagree with (or cannot agree on among themselves). Thus, in the foreign and security 
policy area, diverging views between the most influential actor and the cooperating group 
over  international  security  management  should  induce  intensified  cooperation.  And, 
conversely, if the most influential actor(s) pursue international strategies that are in line 
with the preferences of the presumably balancing states, the perceived need to cooperate 
should either be at a stand-still or even decrease.  
                                                     
20 Hart 1976, p. 297. To a large extent, controlling events and outcomes also involve controlling other actors 
21 Goldgeier & McFaul 1992, p. 467. 
22 Deutsch 1968, p. 41. 
23 Light 1983/84, p. 620. 
24 Zakaria 1992, p. 194. 
25 This possible logic behind cooperation fits nicely with John Ikenberry’s (1986, p. 61f) observation that states “are 
most likely to seek international regime arrangements when they cannot control their environments effectively.”   – 8 – 
Contrary to the balance-of-threat thesis, as discussed above, this line of reasoning should 
hold even if the cooperating group does not in any way perceive the major actor(s) to 
constitute a threat to their own security. Even within a military alliance, such as NATO, 
which rests  on strong common interests,  there will  also  at  times,  and for a variety of 
reasons, be different perceptions on what security strategies to pursue.
26 The perceived 
need to balance should therefore rather be a function of different preferences over how to 
manage international events that are of some importance to both parties. This balance-of-
influence-thesis, as we might call it, should thereby even hold equally well in relation to 
the conditions within a group of states that are closely tied together in collective security 
arrangements. The cooperation should, in sum, develop or intensify in relation to the most 
influential actor during periods of disagreement over international security management.  
During the period analysed in this study, the most influential actor globally has been the 
US.
27 Thus, if the balance-of-influence thesis has any explanatory value, we should expect 
to  observe  changes  in  the  EU’s  collective  foreign  policy  following  periods  when  the 
preferred European and US strategies towards events in the rest of the world have differed 
considerably. These occasions should serve as impulses toward increased cooperation by 
boosting the political will to exert European influence over international events. 
The arguments in existing CFSP studies 
The view that the EPC was initiated – at least in part – in order to influence international 
events is hardly controversial. The suggestion, however, that the EPC and its predecessor 
CFSP might have continued to develop primarily as a result of a generally perceived wish 
to balance American influence on international affairs is more rare to find in the academic 
empirical literature. There are however some analysts who have pointed out a possible link 
between the two on some specific occasions. For instance, and although referring primarily 
to military matters and the WEU, Simon Duke has argued that during the EPC years, a 
series  of  disputes  between  the  US  and  its  allies  “encouraged  greater  exploration  of 
European security co-operation.”
28 John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg have argued that 
“EPC became a form of self-defence to try to ensure that the Community’s preferences 
were not discounted,  or  even ignored  [by the Nixon administration].”
29  Writing more 
specifically on the effects of the strained transatlantic (and intra-European) relations after 
the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis, Christopher Hill argued in 1978 that “the growing 
consensus on the need for a common European foreign policy of some kind testifies to the 
surviving desire to play an important role in world affairs, if not as individual middle-rank 
states, then as a collectivity.”
30  
Taking a broader sweep, David Allen and Michael Smith wrote a few years later that in 
“their  reactions  to  Camp  David,  to  the  Iranian  revolution,  to  the  Soviet  invasion  of 
                                                     
26 Cf. discussion in Jönsson 1979, p. 73; Wallander 1992, p. 50.  
27 Although arguably with some competition from the Soviet Union at times during the Cold War. 
28 Duke 2000, p. 73. 
29 Peterson & Bomberg 1999, p. 229. 
30 Hill 1978, p. 13.   – 9 – 
Afghanistan,  to  the  events  in  Poland  and  to  the  question  of  economic  sanctions,  the 
Europeans  did  indeed  begin  to  build  common  postures  […]  around  their  mutual 
differences with the United States.”
31 Almost two decades on, after the transatlantic (and 
intra-European) rows over how to handle Iraq, Frasier Cameron pointed out that the “EU 
has often moved ahead in the past after such situations.”
32 Therefore, there seems to be 
ample reasons to test these observations in a more systematic manner. 
More often, however, CFSP-analysts tend to argue in favour of a reverse relationship, or 
at least a caveat in the above, by focusing primarily on the heavy European dependence on 
US security guarantees. By assuming that the EPC could never have been initiated without 
the basic security provided by the American military presence in Europe and the mutual 
defence  guarantees  of  the  Atlantic  alliance,  many  argue  that  the  attempts  at  adding  a 
collective  European  voice  in  international  affairs  will  only  be  possible  as  long  as  the 
transatlantic link is alive and healthy.
33 There will, according to this view, constantly be 
EU  members  that  value  the  transatlantic  relationship  over  a  collective  EU  stance  on 
foreign affairs.
34 The result during the Cold War, as William Wallace has argued, was that 
a common EPC line was rarely sustained for any longer period if the US was of another 
opinion: 
The dependence of West European states on American military commitment, during the cold war, 
limited the attractions of this balancing strategy to other states, the German government most of all. Over 
Middle East policy, in 1973-4 and again in 1981, European governments deliberately diverged from the 
line  set  by American leadership,  provoking sharp transatlantic  disagreements  and  a retreat  from  the 
autonomous approaches briefly adopted.
35 
According to this view, many EU members should, in particular, diminish their interest in 
a  collective  foreign  policy  if/when  they  feared  a  lessened  attention  towards  European 
security by the US. That is, if the US reduces its interest in influencing events in the 
European continent, including its willingness to provide a military presence, co-operation 
between the EC/EU members should become more difficult to sustain. This proposition 
has for instance been forwarded by Joseph Joffe, who claims that cooperation was made 
possible  and  easy  under  Pax  Americana.  The  situation,  he  argues,  would  however  be 
entirely different were the US to withdraw from Europe:  
The habits of cooperation would not be unlearned, but its practice would once again be soured by the 
logic  of  relative gain.  […] Pressures  for  self-sufficiency  would  mount,  inevitably leading nations  to 
contribute less to the “collective good” of security rather than more. […] Facing a new demand curve for 
security, individual West European states would not necessarily engage in communal production but 
might scour the market for substitutes.
36 
                                                     
31 Allen & Smith 1984, p. 189. 
32 Cameron 2003. 
33 See for instance Kupchan 1998, p. 43; cf. Mearsheimer 1990, p. 47f. 
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35 Wallace 2002. 
36 Joffe 1987, p. 188. For similar arguments related to the EC/EU, see for instance Waltz 1979, p. 70f; and Art 1996, 
p. 36. For an opposite argument, i.e. that the fundamental rationale for European integration was security concerns 
between the members, but that an increased unilateralist stance from the US nonetheless would lead to increased 
cooperation between the Europeans, see Heurlin 1992, p. 80.   – 10 – 
In  other  words,  and  to  put  it  rather  bluntly,  according  to  these  observers  the  global 
influence of the US should rather make it quite difficult to forge a collective foreign policy 
among the EU member states. Instead of being a driving force behind the development of 
the CFSP, the US, in this view, is rather a dividing force and thereby one of the reasons 
behind  the  CFSP  failures.  Allen  and  Smith  have  for  instance  identified  the  “special 
relationship” between the UK and the US as a “sticking-point” in the development of the 
CFSP.
37 In a similar vein, two other observers argue that “the attitude taken by the US 
towards the EU as a whole helps explain why the latter has been unsuccessful in attaining 
the position of significant international actor.”
38 These observations, which in some ways 
run  counter  to  the  examples  quoted  above,  should  further  highlight  the  value  of 
systematically test the viability of the balance-of-influence thesis. 
Transatlantic disunity as a CFSP catalyst 
In other words, can the successive development of the EPC/CFSP possibly be linked to 
periods  of  transatlantic  disunity?  Answering  that  question  requires  an  account  of  the 
history  of  transatlantic  quarrels  since  1970,  and  a  comparison  with  the  stepwise 
development of the CFSP. Therefore, the following is in no way an accurate picture of EU-
US relations on security policy issues in general, but rather an account of the transatlantic 
history with an exclusive focus on the occasions of disunity, for reason of theory testing. 
Each “period of disunity” is first described generally, and subsequently contrasted to the 
changes in the EPC/CFSP as presented in the diagrams annexed to this paper. 
Neglected and quarrelling over the Middle East 1972-1974 
By the beginning of the 1970s, and in the international climate of détente, the relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the  EC  were  not  characterised  by  any  serious 
disagreements.
39 One issue that had raised concerns in Western Europe at the turn of the 
decade was the uncertainty about the continued American military presence in Europe. 
Burdened by its huge military expenditures abroad, US Congress sought in 1969, and again 
in  1971,  to  reduce  significantly  the  US  military  presence  in  Europe.  Both  times  the 
Administrations  resisted  the  legislation.  The  second  time,  however,  the  defeat  of  the 
Congress nonetheless resulted in stronger pressure on  the European allies  to  assume a 
greater role in the burden-sharing of the defence costs.
40 
From  1972  and  a  few  years  onward,  however,  a  period  of  gradually  more  strained 
relations emerged. Whereas the SALT I treaty between the US and USSR had formalised 
détente and signalled improved relations between the superpowers, it had also been agreed 
without the inclusion of other NATO members, even the two European nuclear powers 
France  and  the  UK.  For  the  EC  members,  this  seemed  to  signal  that  the  Nixon 
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38 Chari & Cavatorta 2003, p. 26. 
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40 US Department of State; Nuttall 1992, p. 82.   – 11 – 
administration saw relations with the Soviet Union as taking precedence over relations 
within the alliance.
41 This was a feeling that lingered on during the coming year.  
Between  the  EC members,  a  belief  that  political  integration  was  on  the  move  had 
started  to  sink  in.  In  October  1972,  at  the  Paris  summit  of  EC  Heads  of  State  or 
Government, the EC members declared their aim to “transforming before the end of the 
present  decade  the  whole  complex  of  their  relations  into  a  European  Union.”
42  The 
decision to enlarge the Community had already been made, and the EC members were 
themselves surprised over their successful collective approach to the Helsinki Conference 
(which were to turn into the CSCE). In the midst of this optimism, the US decided to call 
for a new “Atlantic Charter,” which were to contain a transatlantic “agenda for the future” 
on both economics, diplomacy, and defence. The call was delivered by Henry Kissinger in 
April 1973, in a speech that proclaimed 1973 a “Year of Europe.”  
The speech, however, was not well received in Western Europe. Kissinger suggested in 
his speech that the US had global interests and responsibilities, whereas the EC only had 
regional ones, something which according to one observer “hurt the pride not only of the 
traditional Nation States, but also of the nascent European political persona.”
43 Kissinger 
also  stated  that  “[d]iplomacy is  the subject  of frequent consultations but is  essentially 
being conducted by traditional nation-states.”
44  
In an apparent reaction to both the call for the Carter and the American attitude to the 
EC members’ growing aspirations for a collective political voice in international affairs, the 
EC  members  set  out  to  elaborate  a  “Declaration  on  European  Identity.”
45  The 
Declaration,  it  was  stated,  would  “enable  them  to  achieve  a  better  definition  of  their 
relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place they occupy in 
world affairs.”
46 It contained an admission, or an explanation, that the: 
present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments 
and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great 
powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants to make itself 
heard and play its proper role in the world. 
It was a signal that the EC too had global interests, and was seemingly a direct reply to 
Kissinger’s  speech.  The  declaration  listed  the  EC’s  accomplishments  and  aspirations 
throughout the international system. It spoke for instance of the EC’s interest in preserving 
the historic links with the Middle East, a policy for development aid in a world-wide scale, 
a  balanced  world  economic  system,  contributing  to  cooperation  with  the  USSR,  the 
relations with China, the relations with other Asian states, their traditional bonds with 
Latin America, and of the EC members’ contribution to international progress by adopting 
common positions in for instance the UN. Maybe most importantly, it stated that the 
close ties with the US did “not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish 
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themselves  as a distinct  and original entity.” It  also stated  that  cooperation should be 
developed with the US “on the basis of equality and in a spirit of friendship (emphasis 
added).” 
To  a  large  extent,  the  worsening  relations  across  the  Atlantic  stemmed  from 
disagreements  over  how  to  handle  the  Middle  East  conflict  and  related  issues.  The 
diverging  views  over  strategies  towards  the  Palestinian  question  had  begun  to  surface 
already in 1971, but the October war in 1973 made matters worse. The EC members had 
a fundamentally different view of the events than did the United States. The latter, fearing 
a Soviet intervention, was perceived by the Europeans as obsessed with the Soviet threat. 
The Europeans also did not share the wholehearted American support for Israel.
47 As one 
analyst has commented, the October war “helped to restore faith in the possibilities of a 
united Europe” and consultations “on all levels, particularly between British and French 
officials, acquired new impetus.”
48 The EC members (including the UK) even denied the 
Americans use of NATO military bases for airlifting war material to Israel.
49 Instead, the 
US had to conclude an agreement with Portugal on the use of the Azores Islands as a 
logistics centre.
50  
Meeting  in Brussels  in  November  the  same  year,  the  EC foreign ministers  issued  a 
“Declaration by the Nine on the Situation in the Middle East,”
51 which countered the 
American diplomatic  efforts in almost  every respect. It led  the Israelis  to express both 
“dismay”  and  “surprise,”  and  led  Kissinger  to  privately  express  “disgust”  with  the 
Europeans.
52 The declaration mentioned for the first time “the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinians,” and also called for the peace negotiations to be placed “in the framework of 
the United Nations.” The latter was a response to the US who had, together with the 
USSR and the parties to the conflict but with the exclusion of the EC members, convened 
the Geneva conference in order to find a solution to the conflict.  
A month later, as Kissinger was intensely pursuing his “shuttle diplomacy” with a view 
to find a solution within the Geneva conference, the EC Heads of State and Government 
met in Copenhagen. The summit received an unexpected visit by a delegation of Arab 
foreign ministers,  who  had  been  encouraged  by  the  support  in  the  EPC  declaration  a 
month earlier. They proposed the initiation of a Euro-Arab dialogue, and demanded an 
immediate reply. Taken by surprise, the EC states cautiously signalled a positive response, 
while anticipating American reactions.
53 The news were not heartily received by Kissinger, 
who  has  been  described  as  “driven  to  near  distraction”  when  learning  about  the 
announcement.  This  event  further  exacerbated  the  American  irritation  over  European 
meddling in affairs where they could not themselves contribute constructively.
54 
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The nine EC members thus disagreed with the US not only over how to handle the war, 
but also over the relations with the oil-producing Arab states, over energy policy, and over 
nuclear non-proliferation which became an increasingly politicised issue in connection with 
the discussions on alternative sources of energy in the wake of the oil crisis, all of which in 
turn raised great suspicion and irritation in Washington.
55 Kissinger later commented that 
it dawned upon the Americans that a “Europe reasserting its personality was bound to seek 
to  redress  the  balance  of  influence  with  the  United  States.”
56  In  the  spring  of  1974 
President Nixon even accused the EC members of “ganging up” on the United States.
57 
After a tacit agreement at an informal ministerial meeting in the Schloss Gymnich outside 
Bonn in April 1974,
58 the Nine wowed to inform and consult the US on EPC matters, 
with a “pragmatic approach” and upon agreement between themselves. This decision put 
an end to the openly hostile relations between Nixon and the EC members.
59 
This period, with an “atmosphere of recriminations and suspicions”
60 between the EC 
members and the US, thus had at least three dimensions; an increased perception in most 
EC states of not being taken seriously by the US, increasing disagreements over the events 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and disagreements over energy policy vis-à-vis the oil-
producing Arab states.  However, no substantial quantitative changes  took place in the 
EPC framework during this period (see diagrams in the Appendix). But considering the fact 
that the EPC framework had only very recently been initiated, it produced a somewhat 
surprising amount of unity with both the Middle East declarations and the Declaration on 
European Identity. The former was called  the  “first major common political European 
move” by French newspapers,
61 and the latter may even be seen as the first stumbling 
attempt to formulate a collective view on both global interests and strategies. 
There was also, during this period, a slight increase in the number of issued statements 
in general, and in fact all the statements issued in 1974 did contain references to actions 
undertaken  by  the  Nine/EC.  Thereby  the  balance-of-influence-thesis  is  at  least  not 
contradicted  for  this  period.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  years  following  this  period 
(1976–1978) were characterised by an absence of any serious transatlantic foreign policy 
differences, and also by a stand-still or even lessened EPC activity. 
An abundance of crises 1978-1982 
The  relations  between  the  EC  and  US  improved  somewhat  during  the  Ford 
administration.  Among  other  things,  formal  and  regular  consultations  (twice  a  year) 
between the US president and the head of state or government of the EC Presidency were 
initiated  in  1976.
62  The  transatlantic  relations  improved  further  with  the  election  of 
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President Carter the following year. Carter seemed committed to mend the transatlantic 
relations, and became the first ever US president to officially visit the EC Commission in 
Brussels in 1978.
63 However, the European worries about being neglected by the SALT II 
treaty,  as  mentioned  above,  soon  turned  to  worries  about  Carter’s  increased 
confrontational stance against the Soviet Union. This resulted in an increased scepticism 
about US determination to cultivate détente, and generated a somewhat more positive 
tone in the European support for SALT II.
64  
During 1979 the transatlantic relations took a turn for the worse.
65 The first event in a 
series of overlapping crises was the quarrels in 1978 over the development and planned 
deployment of enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs), the so called “neutron bomb”, in 
West Germany.
66 During the same period, the US brokered the Camp David accords in 
1978, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, something that was viewed with concern in 
Europe  and  seen  as  in  the  worst  case  preclude  rather  than  promote  a  comprehensive 
solution  to  the  situation  in  the  Middle  East.
67  Subsequently,  the  deterioration  in  the 
relations between the superpowers in 1979 was followed by a number of disagreements 
between the United States and its European partners. Two observers even speak about the 
“emergence of a transatlantic conflict syndrome” during this time.
68 
In November 1979, in the wake of the Shah’s flight from the country, the American 
embassy in Teheran was invaded and the embassy staff taken hostage.
69 The United States 
immediately reacted by imposing an embargo on Iranian oil, and freezing Iranian assets in 
the US. The EC members were considerably more reluctant to impose sanctions, fearing 
that such actions would only weaken the position of the moderates in Iran and possibly 
reinforce  the  links  between  Moscow  and  Teheran.  Despite  verbally  condemning  the 
hostage taking, it took some four months before the EC finally gave in to US pressure on 
the issue of sanctions. They did so after the US had made it clear that it would otherwise 
attempt to consider military action to free the hostages. By the beginning of April 1980, 
the Nine issued a threat of sanctions to Teheran, and began the preparations. On April 22, 
the nine foreign ministers again discussed the issue in the margins of a Council meeting in 
Luxembourg. The White House signalled satisfaction and a delay of any military action 
until the summer. The Nine were taken as much by surprise as the rest of the world when 
President  Carter  just  two  days  later  nonetheless  ordered  a  military  hostage-rescue 
operation. The operation failed to release the hostages, and eight Americans were killed. 
Despite the resulting strain in transatlantic relations, the nine foreign ministers decided in 
May 1980 to impose the sanctions against Iran.
70 
The hostage taking in Teheran was followed only weeks later by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979. The Carter administration reacted sharply, by immediately 
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imposing  economic  sanctions  and  voiced  a  proposal  for  a  boycott  of  the  Moscow 
Olympics. SALT II was also put on ice, and Carter proposed large increases in the defence 
budget.
71  America’s  European  allies  did  however  not  completely  share  Washington’s 
reading of the situation, and were somewhat surprised at the harsh American reaction.
72 
Concerned first  and foremost with détente  on the European continent,  the  Europeans 
preferred to define the invasion as a North-South issue. Internally somewhat divided, but 
united in their general doubt of the efficiency of sanctions and worried about the effects on 
détente, the European response was therefore less dramatic. Whereas the EC members 
collectively gave verbal support for the American measures, the Europeans were less keen 
on  imposing  sanctions  of  their  own.  Their  immediate  reaction  was  to  withdraw  the 
Community food aid programme for Afghanistan, and to distribute emergency aid to the 
Afghan refugees. The EC members also implemented measures to prevent undercutting the 
US  sanctions on grains exports  to  the USSR.
73 A few months later,  again after strong 
American  pressure,  the  Europeans  also  agreed  to  a  “no  exceptions”  policy  on  high-
technology exports to the Soviet Union.
74 
The  disagreements  over  strategies  in  relation  both  to  the  events  in  Iran  and  in 
Afghanistan, in combination with disagreements over nuclear strategy, created what some 
have even termed a crisis in the transatlantic relations.
75 The strains between the European 
allies and the Carter administration increased further during the summer 1980 when the 
EC  issued  its  “Venice  declaration”,  proposing  a  different  solution  to  the  Arab-Israeli 
conflict than the one advocated by the US in the Camp David peace process.
76 At the end 
of Carter’s presidency, transatlantic relations in general, and relations between Carter and 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in particular, were severely strained.
77 
The  growing unrest  in  Poland  in  1980-1981,  which  coincided  with  the  election  of 
Ronald Reagan in the US, did nothing to improve the relations.  The European and the 
American responses to the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 were 
disconcerted and showed, again, fundamental differences in the reading of the situation. 
The US took the view that sanctions would serve several purposes, one of which would be 
to reduce the Soviet resources available for military spending. The EC members, although 
also  internally  divided,  were  doubtful  about  the  effects  of  sanctions  and  were  rather 
emphasising the positive results of economic interdependence and continued trade. The 
Polish example, according to the European view, showed that détente had had positive 
effects and had restrained the Soviet Union in its response to the events in Poland.
78  
The EC-US debate over sanctions against the Soviet Union was however also closely 
tied to another transatlantic disagreement that had contributed to the strained relations 
already during the last years of the Carter administration – Western Europe’s participation 
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in the Siberian natural gas pipeline project. The pipeline, built to transport natural gas 
from  Siberia  to  Western  Europe,  was  to  be  finished  in  the  mid-1980s  and  aimed  at 
providing  ten  Western  European  states  with  natural  gas  from  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
project was largely financed by EC members (by credits granted to the Soviet Union) and 
relied heavily on Western technology.
79  
When General Jaruzelski, pressured by the USSR, proclaimed martial law in Poland in 
December 1981, the immediate American reaction was to announce sanctions against the 
Polish government,  followed  by  sanctions  directed  also  against  the  Soviet  Union.  The 
United States also pressed the West Europeans to follow suit, but while condemning in 
strong diplomatic language the imposition of martial  law  and warning against an open 
Soviet intervention, the Europeans did not in any substantial way give in to American 
wishes. The  collective measures  taken by  the EC states were  limited  to  certain quota 
reductions on imports from the Soviet Union. The EC members refused to put blame on 
the  Polish  government,  and  never  contemplated  any  Community  sanctions  against 
Poland.
80 
Part of the American sanctions consisted of a an export ban on components for the gas 
turbine compressors built by Western European companies and due for further export to 
the  Soviet Union for the construction of the gas pipeline.
81 A French firm, capable  of 
producing  the  same  components  (under  licence  from  General  Electric)  nonetheless 
continued to provide the pipeline project with the compressors. West Germany granted 
the Soviet Union over $500 million in new credits, and was contemplating full financing of 
the pipeline. By the summer of 1982, this led to an extension of the American embargo to 
include component manufacturers that were subsidiaries or licencees of American firms. 
The foreign ministers of the EC reacted in unison and disputed the decision. They also 
encouraged  their  firms  to  disobey  what  they  perceived  to  be  dubious  extraterritorial 
legislation. In response, the US imposed new direct sanctions on the European firms that 
continued to deliver components to the pipeline project.
82 Instead of a trade war with the 
Soviet Union, there seemed to be one developing between the US and the EC.
83 
What looked like a looming “outright rupture in the transatlantic relations”
84 – Henry 
Kissinger called it a crisis that was “more genuinely, objectively, serious than ever,”
85 – 
seemed to worsen further in June 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. The EC members, 
using for the first time the new crisis mechanism introduced into the EPC framework the 
previous year, were swift in producing a collective stance despite internal divisions. They 
agreed to distribute emergency aid to the refugees in Lebanon, refused to sign the second 
EC-Israeli Financial Protocol, and postponed a planned meeting of the Joint EC-Israeli 
Cooperation  Council.
86  They  were  however  not  able  to  keep  up  the  momentum  and 
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propose any further constructive solutions. France wanted to extend the EPC position, to 
recognise the PLO as an “essential interlocutor” and mention the Palestinian’s rights to a 
states  structure  of  their  choice,  but  did  not  receive  enough  support  from  the  other 
members. Together with Egypt, France attempted instead to move things forward in the 
UN  Security  Council.  A  French-Egyptian  draft  Security  Council  resolution,  aimed  at 
renewing the Middle East peace process and re-emphasising the role of the Palestinians, 
was however vetoed by the United States.
87 
Both the disagreements over the pipeline project and the Middle East found (at least 
temporary) solutions in late 1982.  The dispute  over the pipeline ended in November, 
when a deal was made that the American sanctions against European firms would end and 
that the US would not oppose the completion of the pipeline in return for a promise by 
the  West  Europeans  to  refrain from new  high  technology  agreements  with  the  Soviet 
Union. The disagreements over the Middle East ended more as a result of lack of internal 
European  agreement,  in  combination  with  the  inclusion  of  France  and  Italy  in  the 
Lebanese peace-keeping force.
88  
Thus,  by  the  end  of  1982  the  transatlantic  disagreements  over  external  security 
provision seemed temporarily quite harmonious. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland 
Islands in April 1982 had not caused any serious quarrels across the Atlantic. The EC 
members  reacted  in  unison  by  imposing  sanctions  against  Argentina  and  the  EC 
Commission  issued  a  statement  condemning  the  aggression  “against  a  British  territory 
linked to the European Community.”
89 The US subsequently supported and followed suit 
with sanctions against Argentina. The US and its NATO allies also seemed generally in 
agreement during the following year over the ongoing processes within NATO.
90  
During this period, between 1979 and 1982, there was also, for the first time in the 
history of EPC, a considerable rise in the number of issued statements in general (see 
Appendix). To a large extent, the increase was accounted for by collective statements on 
the  very  issues  described  above,  in  particular  the  conflicts  in  the  Middle  East.  But 
especially  in  1981,  both  new  states  and  new  issues,  not  always  related  to  the  above 
transatlantic quarrels, also made their way into EPC statements. By 1982, the share of 
statements  containing  references  to  activities  undertaken  also  increased  considerably 
compared  to previous years.  Thus,  this period  of sometimes severely strained relations 
between the EC members and the US, primarily over security provision outside their own 
geographical boundaries, did indeed coincide with the first step of significant change in the 
contents of the EPC on a general level. It is noteworthy that the Falkland Islands crisis, 
which is hitherto the only military invasion that an EU member has been subject to since 
the inception of the ECP, was one of the few international events that did not cause any 
serious disagreements between the US and the EC members. 
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Star Wars, Libya, and Central America 1983–1986 
Between 1983 and 1986, however,  the  transatlantic relations again turned increasingly 
strained.  Two  of  the  issues  causing  renewed  tensions  were  the  American  plans  for  a 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI),  and the American policy  towards  Libya. The initial 
announcement, by  the  Reagan administration in 1983, about  the plans for a  Strategic 
Defence Initiative (SDI) came without any prior consultations with the European allies.
91 
It  signalled  again  a  unilateral  turn  in American foreign  policy.  To  the  Europeans,  the 
decision seemed to undermine one of the central NATO doctrines – the avoidance of war 
by nuclear deterrent – and would instead provide the US with a protective shield against a 
nuclear  attack.  It  also  raised  questions  about  future  reliance  on  US  commitments  to 
European security. If the initiative would have been countered by the Soviet Union, the 
prospective battlefield between the superpowers would most certainly be in Europe, where 
great  offensive military power was projected but  where relatively little defensive power 
would exist compared to the shielded superpowers.
92 The Europeans, however, could not 
reach an agreement over a common attitude towards the SDI initiative, which was formally 
launched in 1985, and eventually Germany and the UK ended up participating in the 
initiative.
93  
The  simultaneous  developments  in  northern  Africa  put  further  strains  on  the 
transatlantic relationship. In 1983, Libya had threatened to march into Egypt, and the 
same year, first Libyan and then French troops had entered Chad. The US saw the Libyan 
actions as a new Cold War challenge, and sent AWACS intelligence aircraft to Egypt and 
offered to support the French militarily in Chad. France, however, saw the American Cold 
War rhetoric as unhelpful and feared it would only aggravate the conflict. Nonetheless, 
American ships and aircraft were sent to the coast outside Libya, which only served to raise 
several European voices over the American tendency to oversimplify and place third world 
conflicts into the familiar pattern of Cold War thinking.
94  
By the mid-1980s, a large increase in international terrorism was also linked to inter alia 
Libya.  In  1985,  the  airports  in  Rome  and  Vienna  were  hit  by  terrorist  attacks,  and 
evidence pointed to Libyan involvement. The Reagan administration sought to get the 
Western European governments to agree on sanctions, again threatening to use force in 
Libya should the EC fail to comply, but the latter refused. The EC even refused to name 
Libya  as  responsible  for  international  terrorism,  and  the  only  action  taken  by  the  EC 
members were increased security measures (including airport security and visa policies) and 
the  setting  up  of  a  new  working  group  on  international  terrorism  in  Brussels.  In  the 
beginning  of  1986,  Reagan  announced  new  sanctions  against  Libya  but  excluded 
subsidiaries  of  American  firms,  in  order  to  avoid  renewed  European  complaints  over 
extraterritorial legislation.
95 
                                                     
91 Berkhof 1987, p. 205; Kahler & Link 1996, p. 87. 
92 Duke 2000, p. 73; Rummel 1990a, p. 8; Hiester 1991, p. 34; Joffe 1987, p. xiv; Allen & Smith 1990, p. 228; 
Kahler & Link 1996, p. 88. 
93 Nuttall 1992, p. 196f. 
94 Calleo 1987, p. 80; Calvocoressi 1991, p. 491. 
95 Rose 1999, p. 143; Nuttall 1991, p. 303; Allen & Smith 1990, p. 233f.   – 19 – 
In April 1986, a bomb exploded in a night club in West Berlin, killing and injuring 
American servicemen who frequented the club. The perpetrators were Palestinians, but 
said to have links with Libyan officials in East Germany.
96 The US reacted with a bombing 
raid  over  several  Libyan  targets,  including  Colonel  Qaddafi’s  residence.  The  Reagan 
administration first termed the strikes “retaliation”, but later rephrased the language to 
instead claim “self-defence” according to article 51 of the UN Charter. Whereas the UK 
provided indirect military support for the operation, by allowing the US the use of British 
airports, the Europeans in general were not in agreement with Reagan over the legality or 
appropriateness of the air strikes.
97 Many EC members even denied the Americans to use 
their air space for the operation. In connection to the American air strikes, however, the 
EC members imposed certain diplomatic sanctions on Libya and also banned arms sales to 
the country.
98 In response to Libyan threats against individual EC member states, they 
declared that any such acts of violence would bring forth “an appropriate response on the 
part of the Twelve.”
99 These steps by the EC encouraged President Reagan, who again 
sought to persuade the Europeans to adopt a new set of sanctions, but with no result.
100 
During 1986, European scepticism over US foreign policy increased further, when, for 
instance, the US decided to renew its stocks of chemical weapons, and signalled a stop for 
its compliance with the unratified SALT II treaty. In June 1986, the Foreign Minister 
agreed  that  they  needed  to  strengthen  the  political  dialogue  with  the  US,  and  in 
September  they  formally  confirmed  the  practice  of  having  the  Presidency’s  Foreign 
Minister visiting Washington during every term of office. They also agreed that the twelve 
embassies in Washington should hold regular contacts with the host government. At the 
same  time,  they  rejected  an  American  proposal  for  regular  contacts  with  the  US  on 
working group level, fearing that this would allow the US to split the group before any 
common positions could be found.
101 Only weeks later, however, the US again managed to 
upset the Europeans, as Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik in October 1986. Again, 
it seemed that decisions about future security provision in Europe were taken without the 
involvement of the Western European states.
102 In addition, the discussions held during 
the  Reykjavik  summit  seemed  to  signal  a  serious  risk  of  decoupling  of  US  and  West 
European  security  strategies  and  to  leave  the  Europeans  considerably  more  open  to 
security threats by Soviet conventional forces. These risks, in combination with the fact 
that the Europeans had not been consulted on beforehand, led to what some have termed 
a “full-blown Atlantic crisis”.
103 
Despite  being  united  in  their  worries,  the  EC  members  were  prevented  to  discuss 
defence issues in the EPC framework. Eventually UK prime minister Thatcher assumed the 
role (on behalf of some of the European allies) to meet with President Reagan to elicit an 
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explanation  and  discuss  “the  way  forward  on  arms  control  after  Reykjavik”.
104  The 
Reykjavik  meeting  however  also  had  another  effect;  by  raising  new  worries  about  the 
American commitment to European security, it contributed strongly to the (re)emergence 
of the discussions about a European pillar within Nato, built around a distinct European 
security  and  defence  identity  (ESDI).  Steps  were  soon  taken  to  revive  the  dormant 
Western European Union as a forum for such discussions.
105 
During the mid-1980s, however, also developments elsewhere added to the transatlantic 
tensions. One such area was Central America. The EC’s involvement in the peace process 
started in 1984, when the EC foreign ministers met with the Contadora Group
106 and the 
Central American republics in San José in Costa Rica to discuss peace initiatives. The 
foreign ministers from the two EC applicant states, Spain and Portugal, also participated. 
The United  States,  on  the  other hand, was not invited  and  the EC’s peace proposals 
included among other things the removal of foreign advisers from Central America and the 
cessation of external provision of arms.
107 The signal was clearly an implicit response to the 
American support of, inter alia, the contras in Nicaragua. By doing this, according to two 
observers, “the Europeans put themselves into direct confrontation with US policies.”
108  
The  American  reaction  was  hostile,  and  Washington  undertook  open  attempts  at 
excluding Nicaragua from participating in the ministerial meeting with the EC. The US 
Secretary of State, George Schultz, also sent what was perceived as an insulting letter to 
each  of  the  EC  foreign  ministers,  urging  them  not  to  support  the  Sandinistas.  The 
President  of  the  EC  Council,  French  Foreign  Minister  Claude  Cheysson,  responded: 
“What business does Reagan have in any of this? As far as I know, he is neither a member 
of the EEC nor of the Contadora group nor of the Central American nations.”
109 However, 
contrary to the controversy over sanctions in relation to Poland a couple of years earlier, 
the United States chose not to pursue the matter further.
110  
In sum, this was a period when, as one historian has put it, America’s European allies 
had “found themselves relegated virtually to satellite status, their value judged according to 
their ‘loyalty,’ and their loyalty assessed by their readiness to accede unquestioningly to 
American demands.”
111 Again, however, just as the first years of the 1980s, such feelings 
coincided  with  a  generally  more  active  foreign  policy  cooperation  between  the  EC 
members. In terms of the EPC statements, the period between 1984 and 1986 also marked 
the second period of increased activities stemming from the foreign policy cooperation. 
This is the more remarkable when considering that the EC members were severely divided 
over internal EC policies at the time, and even refrained for several months from passing 
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any declarations in the name of the Heads of State and Government.
112 In 1985 and 1986, 
following what has been called a period when “the US began to challenge the Soviet Union 
[…]  in  a  manner  unprecedented  since  the  early  Cold  War,”
113  the  number  of  EPC 
statements grew larger than ever before. 
Contrary to the previous periods described above, the increasing amount of statements 
during this time is however not primarily explained by a focus on the events during which 
the EC members and the US openly disagreed. As shown in the Appendix, the statements 
during this time testify to a growing global focus, with both Latin America, Africa and Asia 
receiving more collective attention from the EC members than ever before. The number of 
the  statements  containing  references  to  specific  activities  undertaken  by  the  EC  also 
increased compared to 1983. As for the thematic cover of the statements, there was a sharp 
rise in the number of statements containing references to the importance of democracy and 
human rights. Thus, this period of diverging transatlantic views on international politics 
did again coincide with an increased activity within the EPC framework. 
The shadow of Reykjavik and a lonely superpower 1987-1992 
The  rest  of  the  1980s  were  not  characterised  by  any  new  serious  and  openly  voiced 
security-related quarrels across the Atlantic. Nonetheless, the distrust in US foreign policy 
in other parts of the world, and the uncertainty in Europe over the American commitment 
to  European  security,  increased  further  during  the  last  year  of  the  second  Reagan 
administration. One observer ever claims that “the year 1987 saw relations between the 
governments of the United States and its European allies reach a nadir for which it would 
be difficult to find an equal – the Suez crisis of 1956 exepted – during the whole of the 
postwar period.”
114 
One event that seriously damaged the Europeans’ views of US foreign policy in 1987 
was the unfolding revelations, starting in November 1986, about the Iran-Contra scandal. 
The Europeans, having for a long time been pressured by the US on both a strict policy of 
no ransom money to terrorists in hostage situations, and on sanctions against Iran, were 
shocked to learn about both the arms transfers to Iran and the connected deals to free 
American hostages in Lebanon. The subsequent revelations that payments from the arms 
deals had been transferred to support the contras in Nicaragua – another issue over which 
the  US  and  the  Europeans  had  for  years  held  diverging  views,  further  outraged  the 
European governments. But even more than the content of the Iran-Contra package, as 
one analyst has put it, the wide-spread alarm in Europe stemmed from “the fact that it 
existed at all, the kind of people responsible for it, and the light it shed on the nature of 
Mr.  Reagan’s presidency.”
115 The credibility of American foreign policy in general  was 
seriously damaged. 
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A huge American budget deficit at the time, in combination with the resumed détente 
and the effects it had on various disarmament initiatives, also made the European allies 
increasingly worried about the commitment of the US to keep their conventional forces in 
Europe.
116 In late 1987, American rhetoric over defence cooperation in Western Europe 
changed.  President  Reagan  quite  unexpectedly  expressed  unusually  strong  support  for 
West Europe’s attempts to come up with a common European voice in the transatlantic 
security discussions, and also expressed support for the construction of a European pillar 
within NATO. He also expressed hopes of an Atlantic alliance “among equals”, which on 
the one hand was what the European allies had long asked for, but which could also be 
interpreted  as  part  of  a  trend  of  American  wishes  to  reduce  its  military  presence  in 
Europe.
117 In late 1988,  these worries were reinforced further when the  Soviet  Union 
announced, by the end of the year, plans for substantial reductions of its forces and the 
withdrawal  of  parts  of  its  military  presence  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  A  Soviet 
withdrawal  raised  fears  over  renewed  discussions  in  Washington  over  burden-sharing 
within the alliance and the rationale behind a continued American participation in security 
provision in Europe.
118  
When George Bush took office in early 1989, the American rhetoric on West European 
security changed further. Compared to Reagan, Bush was considerably more prepared to 
talk about the EC and US as “partners.” It seems however as if the US over the coming 
years were increasingly unsure about its policy towards West European security. During 
the spring and summer 1989, Bush signalled a continued commitment and determination 
for a continued American presence in Europe.
119 Following the dramatic events in East 
Europe  in  late  1989,  the  Bush  administration  recognised  the  EC’s  leading  role  in  the 
reform process, and also welcomed the German unification, as long as it would “occur in 
the  context  of  Germany’s  continued  commitment  to  NATO  and  to  an  increasingly 
integrated  European  Community.”
120  Not  long  thereafter,  however,  and  as  the  EC 
members were discussing to introduce issues of defence policy into the new Treaty on 
European  Union,  the  European  capitals  received  a  letter,  drawn  up  by  the  State 
Department, warning against building up a European defence identity within the EU and 
containing implicit treats about force withdrawal from the US side.
121 Thus, the period 
surrounding the end of the Cold War was clearly marked by an increased uncertainty in 
Europe over the continued role of the US in the European security structure.
122  
Between 1987 and 1992, however, there were no serious open disagreements across the 
Atlantic over international events. The initial US policy over the accelerating conflicts in 
Yugoslavia during 1990 and 1991 signalled US reliance and acceptance of a leadership role 
for the EC states. The Bush administration was hesitant over the United States’ new role 
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as a sole superpower, and after the Gulf War the Americans were wary of the risk of setting 
a new precedence of the US as a “world policeman” and reluctant to advocate a military 
intervention in The Balkans.
123 Early into the Balkan conflicts, the EC also did come up 
with a few instruments novel to the EPC framework. The first one was the decision in 
1991 to send the Troika to negotiate a cease-fire. This was the first time the Troika not 
only represented the Twelve, but also negotiated on their behalf. Another was the setting up 
of an unarmed European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which represented 
the  first  time  that  uniformed  personnel  were  sent  out  in  the  name  of  the  EC.
124 
Discussions  between  the  EC  members,  furthermore,  also  bordered  on  military  issues, 
despite  the  treaty’s  exclusion  of  such issues.  During  one  of  the  many  Troika  visits  to 
Yugoslavia, Dutch Foreign Minister Van Den Broek even seems to have used the threat 
that  the  EU  might  ask  the  WEU  to  send  “something  like  a  peace  force  to  the 
country.”
125At one point, the Twelve also asked the WEU to look into the possibilities of 
such a mission to Eastern Croatia.
126 
The  European  Union  had  also  generally  seemed  in  agreement  with  the  US  over 
international  security  provision  immediately  after  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall,  and  has 
sometimes been described as a cheerleader to the US during the Gulf War.
127 This period 
can thus be characterised as starting with a serious blow to the credibility of US foreign 
policy, and throughout being a time of unusually high uncertainty over US foreign and 
security policy intentions, rather than displaying open disagreements over policies in other 
parts of the world. 
Again, this period (which is in some ways difficult to separate entirely from the previous 
one) coincides with quite substantial changes in the EPC statements. Between 1987 and 
1988, the number of issued statements rose with the largest increase up to that point in 
EPC history, and continued to rise every year up until 1992, when the upward trend was 
temporarily broken. The amount of new states addressed also increased considerably, and 
so did the variety of issues covered by the statements. The large number of new states 
addressed for the first time during this period is only partly explained by the proliferation 
of  new  independent  former  USSR  states.
128  Even  more  than  for  any  of  the  previous 
periods,  these  changes  were  also  not  directly  connected  to  specific  policy  differences 
between the EC members and the US, as some of the empirical propositions laid out above 
would have predicted. There  was  clearly an increasing tendency  to  address  events  and 
issues wherever they appeared.  
In 1989, and again in 1991, the number of statements with references to specific actions 
undertaken  also  significantly  increased.  In  1991,  for  the  first  time,  there  was  also  a 
considerable gap between the amount of references to various diplomatic activities and 
economic  activities.  Whereas  the  statements  mentioning  economic  measures  increased 
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slightly, the amount of statements referring to diplomatic activities almost tripled between 
1990 and 1991. Thus, this period of distrust in US foreign policy in general, combined 
with genuine uncertainty over future US policies  towards European security provision, 
coincided with the most dramatic increases in the activities in the EPC framework up until 
this point. It did of course also coincide with the end of the Cold War and thus with one 
of the most dramatic changes in the international system since the second World War. 
Disagreeing over Yugoslavia 1993-1995 
Along with the intensification of the conflict in Bosnia, US and EU opinions over strategies 
also started to diverge. Between 1993 and 1995 the transatlantic relations were marked by 
a series of disagreements over policies in relation to former Yugoslavia, and sometimes 
seemed cooler than they had been in decades. One analyst has termed this period a “break-
point” in the Europeanist challenge to NATO, and another points out that the Yugoslav 
conflict “caused some extremely bitter Europe-United States recriminations.”
129 
With the new Clinton administration in 1993, the US increasingly tended to define the 
conflict in Bosnia as one with a clear aggressor (Serbia) against another state (Bosnia), 
whereas the EU tended to emphasise that the conflicts were more complex than that.
130 
Many Europeans also feared that the new American president, having won the election on 
a strong platform on domestic policies, might reject much of his predecessor’s transatlantic 
focus.
131 The Clinton administration also soon found itself on a collision course with the 
Western  European  states  over  what  strategies  to  pursue  in  relation  to  the  conflict  in 
Bosnia. 
First, disagreements over the so called Vance-Owen plan in February 1993 resulted in 
what one observer has described as the worst condition in US-European relations since the 
Suez crisis of the 1950s.
132 President Clinton and state secretary Warren Christopher then, 
in an attempt to avoid the engagement of ground troops, tried during the spring of 1993 to 
convince their European partners to go along with a ‘lift and strike’ policy against former 
Yugoslavia. It involved a limited lifting of the arms embargo to allow for arms import by 
the  Bosnian  authorities,  and  limited  air-strikes  to  deter  Serb  aggression  during  the 
transitional  period.  Getting  no  European  support,  in  part  due  to  European  fears  for 
possible retaliation against their own UN troops already on the ground, the plans for lifting 
the arms embargo were put on hold temporarily and did not reach the forefront of the 
debate again until August 1994.
133  
At the NATO summit in January 1994, the Clinton administration showed a renewed 
interest  in  the  Atlantic  Alliance  and  a  determination  to  continue  the  US  presence  in 
Europe.  Shortly  after,  however,  the  US  began  to  signal  a  more  unilateralist  stance  in 
relation to the Bosnian conflict, and President Clinton again threatened to abandon the 
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arms embargo. This led to renewed tensions in the transatlantic relations, and the situation 
in the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995 has been described as a new low, “with the 
NATO  alliance in serious danger of irreparable damage over  conflicting European and 
American  approaches  to  the  conflict  in  the  Yugoslav  successor  states.”
134  After  an 
increasingly active role played by the US during 1995, and an increasing agreement within 
the so called Contact Group over how to pursue the international peace efforts in Bosnia, 
the  Dayton  peace  agreement  was  signed  in  November  1995.  This  event  marked  a 
temporary end to the transatlantic disagreements over the Balkans. 
During  this  period,  there  was  again  a  visible  increase  in  foreign  policy  activities  in 
general, stemming from what had by now turned into the second pillar of the EU. In 1994 
and 1995, the amount of issued statements grew, although only to reach the 1991 level, 
but in 1996 the number of statements reached a new high. Activities in relation to the 
conflict in the Balkans accounts for part of the increase, but so did also for instance the 
EU’s efforts towards the Great Lakes Region in Africa.
135 Also other parts of Africa, the 
Middle East, and Latin America received increased attention, despite any serious policy 
differences between the EU and the US in those areas at the time.  
During  this  period,  the  contents  of  the  statements  also  became  considerably  more 
detailed, and the share of statements referring to activities undertaken by the EU increased 
considerably  compared  to  the  immediate  post-Cold  War  period.  For  instance,  the 
tendency to dispatch of “EU personnel” in the form of for instance election monitors or so 
called special representatives, increased considerably in the mid-1990’s.
136 Thereby, also 
this period of quite serious transatlantic disagreements over security provision coincided 
with substantial changes in the CFSP – although not exclusively, or even primarily, related 
to the very issues over which EU and US strategy preferences varied. 
Extraterritorial legislation and unruly states 1996-1999 
In the spring and summer of 1996, serious transatlantic differences arose first over the 
Cuban  Liberty  and Democratic  Solidarity Act  (the  so  called  Helms-Burton  Act).  The 
disagreements  soon  increased  further  with  the  passing  of  the  similar  Iran  and  Libya 
Sanctions Act (so called d’Amato Act). These acts, again, raised the contentious issues of 
US  extraterritorial  legislation  and  how  to  handle  states  that  were  either  assumed  to 
sponsor terrorism or in other ways caused international concern. 
The Helms-Burton Act had been passed by Congress and signed by President Clinton in 
response to the shooting down of two American civilian aircraft (owned by Cuban exiles) 
in international air space outside Havana in February 1996. The Act aimed at discouraging 
foreign  investment  in  Cuba,  inter  alia  by  allowing  for  lawsuits  against  non-US  firms 
investing in previously US-owned properties in Cuba and denying visas to executives of 
such firms.
137 The issue of extraterritorial legislation again came to the fore, and while the 
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EU  condemned  the  criminal  act  perpetrated  by  Castro,  the  Union  also  loudly  voiced 
criticism  over  the  Helms-Burton Act.  The  EU,  according  to  one  observer,  “showed  a 
remarkable consensus of opposition” and “revealed impressive unity.”
138  
The disunity between the EU and the US over how to deal with “rouge states” and 
international terrorism increased further with the signing into law of the d’Amato Act in 
August 1996. The d’Amato Law contained similar provisions for extraterritorial imposition 
of US law as did the Helms-Burton Law, and aimed at blocking new investments in Libya 
and Iran.
139 In the following discussions within the EU, several counter measures were 
openly discussed. These included trade sanctions against the US, a regulation preventing 
European firms to comply with the US legislation, stricter visa regulations for executives of 
US firms, and steps towards a dispute settlement panel in the WTO.
140 These commonly 
voiced  European  concerns,  however,  fell  on  deaf  American  ears,  and  the  discussions 
between the EU and the US stalled. The disagreement became even more acute when, in 
the  autumn  of  1997  French,  Russian  and  Malaysian  firms  announced  a  $2  billion 
investment deal in Iran.
141  
The transatlantic tensions did not subside until a (temporary) compromise deal was 
reached in the spring of 1998. It included a US promise not to enforce parts of the law on 
European companies in return for firmer EU export control regarding weapons technology 
to Iran and closer EU-US cooperation with regard to Cuba, and also involved a promise 
from the EU not to pursue the matter further the WTO.
142 The agreement, however, was 
an uneasy compromise and rested on congressional cooperation, something that could not 
be taken for granted in the long run.
143 In 1999, threats again arose from the EU (driven 
primarily by Spain) to  take  the  US  to  the  WTO over  Washington’s  threats  against  a 
Spanish hotel group investing in Cuba.
144 
The disagreement over the d’Amato Act in particular was only one aspect of a wider 
disagreement over how to handle the relations with Iran. The EU and the US had no 
problems agreeing over how to define the underlying problematique in relation to Iran. 
Concerns were shared over Iran’s support for terrorism, its stand on Israel, its suspected 
programme for weapons of mass destruction and its disregard for human rights.
145 The 
disagreement,  again,  was  rather  on  how  to  deal  with  these  problems.
146  In  1993,  the 
Clinton administration announced the abandonment of the previous American policy of 
reliance on a regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf region and aimed instead at a 
policy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. The US was to build up a considerable 
military presence in surrounding friendly states and thereby contain both Iran and Iraq.
147 
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This dual containment policy was announced only months after the EC had, in December 
1992,  announced  its  wishes  to  purse  a  “critical  dialogue”  with  Iran,  in  order  to  keep 
channels  open  and  thereby  hoping  to  exert  at  least  some  degree  of  influence  on  the 
moderates in Teheran.
148 President Clinton nonetheless tried to persuade the Europeans 
to impose sanctions against Iran, but was met with a firm no.  
The American  attitudes  towards  Iran further hardened  in  1995  when,  among  other 
things, it became known that Russia and Iran had finalised a nuclear reactor deal.
149 The 
US imposed new unilateral sanctions against Iran, banning all trade with and investment in 
the country, something that further increased the tensions between the EU and the US.
150 
The EU continued to advocate the venue of a critical dialogue until, in April 1997, a 
German  court  found  Iranian  authorities  responsible  for  the  killing  of  three  Kurdish 
opposition members in a restaurant in Berlin. The European Union immediately called for 
a halt of any dialogue and withdrew their ambassadors from Teheran.
151 This event raised 
hopes in the US for a change of opinion in the European capitals with regard to sanctions. 
However, the election not long after these events of reform-minded Mohammad Khatami 
for president changed the situation. The EU resumed its relations with Iran, under the new 
concept of “constructive dialogue.” Not until the agreement in 1998 between the EU and 
the US over the issue of extraterritorial legislation did US and EU disagreements over Iran 
recede.
152 
By  this  time  however,  the  Balkans  once  again  came  into  focus  of  the  transatlantic 
relations. When the conflict in Kosovo deteriorated during the fall of 1998, discussions 
resumed over the possibilities of a military intervention. It became clear that Russia and 
China would veto a Security Council resolution to that effect, and discussions turned to 
the  possibilities  of  NATO  undertaking  such  an  operation  in  spite  of  this.  Somewhat 
surprisingly,  and  despite  occasional  dissension  over  the  forms  of  intervention  (ground 
troops or not) in Yugoslavia, the allies from both sides of the Atlantic were at least on the 
surface united in their support of the NATO-led air campaign in the spring of 1999. The 
European lessons learned, however, were that their defence organisations only had very 
limited  possibilities  for  power  projection  and  deployment  of  forces  outside  their  own 
borders. The continued heavy reliance on the US for any large scale military operations 
was highly felt, and raised renewed debates in Europe over the desirability of some form of 
autonomous European defence capability.
153  
Also this period coincide with new all-time highs in the CFSP output. In 1996 the 
amount of issued statements was the highest ever up to that date, and a new record was 
reached in 1998. The CFSP statements also grew considerably more detailed than ever 
before during this period. The share of statements mentioning activities undertaken by the 
EU increased quite dramatically in 1999, in particular the statements containing references 
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to various sorts of political measures. Only part of this increase is accounted for by the 
Kosovo crisis, whereas for instance an ever growing collective interest in various parts of 
Africa also took place during this period. As for Iran, Libya and Cuba, these states seem to 
have continued to attract EU attention, but not to any significantly higher degree than 
previous years.
154 In sum, it seems as if this period, again and just like the previous periods, 
shows a relationship between transatlantic disagreements and intensified CFSP activities.  
The viability of the balance-of-influence thesis 
It  has  been  argued  above  that  the  EU’s  collective  foreign  policy  has  continuously 
intensified, or taken new steps, during periods that were characterised by certain features. 
Contrary to some propositions, it does not primarily seem to have been changes in the 
overarching threats that have set off new collective foreign policy activities. Nor do they 
seem primarily to have been the result of institutional reforms, although the lion’s share of 
the activities would arguably never have been initiated or sustained without the CFSP-
institutions in place. It  seems rather  that  the most forceful factor, preceding both the 
periods of intensified policy and the successive institutional reforms, has been a periodically 
highlighted realisation among the member states  – set  off by intermittent  transatlantic 
disagreements over security management in other parts of the world – that more effort 
have to be placed on forging a collective stance in order to increase the European influence 
over international affairs. 
In  other  words,  judging  from  the  above,  transatlantic  disagreements  have  been 
something  of  a  recurrent  catalyst.  Following  the  periods  of  highly  visible  and  highly 
politicised diverging views between the US and the European Union members – the latter 
also sometimes in disagreement with each other – on international security-related issues, 
there has been an expansion of EU foreign policy activity. The successive new activities 
have, furthermore, rarely been directly related to the contentious issues in themselves, but 
rather constituted by new policy initiatives in only partly related or even unrelated areas. 
These  conclusions  were  drawn  after  studying  the  development  of  the  EPC/CFSP 
between 1970 and 2000. To the extent that these conclusions also carry some degree of 
predictive value, they should hold also for new periods of transatlantic turbulence. A first 
new such turbulent period materialised during the summer and fall of 2002, and intensified 
up until the outbreak of war in March 2003. This period and the following months, while 
described by media as the point in time when European foreign policy was “shifting back 
to  its  natural  home  in  individual  capitals,”
155did  indeed  also  display  a  number  of 
remarkable “firsts” in the history of the CFSP. 
The  year  2003  was  for  instance  the  period  when  the  EU  got  its  first  ever  security 
strategy,  and for  the  first  time  ever  deployed  uniformed  and  armed  EU  personnel  (in 
Bosnia, Macedonia,  and the Congo).
156 The Union also  agreed  on a new EU  strategy 
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against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stepped up its attempts to get the US 
more  actively  involved  in  the  peace  process  in  the  Middle  East,  and  stepped  up  its 
attempts to make the Iranian government suspend its nuclear enrichment activities. During 
2003, the Union furthermore started the planning for new institutional reforms: the first 
ideas for the battle-group concept were presented, proposals surfaced for the reinforcement 
of the planning and mission support facilities in Brussels, and the plans for a European 
Defence Agency took form. And, the current CFSP and ESDP provisions in the Treaty on 
European Union were substantially reformulated by the European Convention and later 
the Intergovernmental Conference. Or, as the Convention Presidium wrote: 
Having reflected at length on the current situation and the lessons of the Iraq crisis, the Praesidium takes 
the view that […] it is also necessary to provide in the Constitution for more effective institutional 
mechanisms to underpin and assist the process.
157 
The result was, inter alia, the proposals for a new post of European Union Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, a new external action service, and an intensified military cooperation with a 
view to carry out more complex and demanding crisis management operations than today.  
Not all of these are necessarily directly a function of the transatlantic disagreements over 
how  to  handle  Iraq,  and  some  might  possibly  have  taken  place  also  without  the 
transatlantic dispute. But, taken together they signify a period when the political will to 
act collectively seems again to have been unusually high. Summing up this period, Javier 
Solana  concluded  that  “[i]n  retrospect,  2003  will  be  seen  as  a  crucial  year  in  the 
remarkably rapid implementation of the European Union’s security and defence policy.”
158 
Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was of the same opinion, arguing that “[w]hile 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and the Congo may be minor steps on the world scale, I 
consider them major steps for the European Union.”
159 And, the late Swedish Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh explicitly connected the issue of US influence with for instance 
the EU’s Congo mission, by arguing that the latter was  
an important example of what the EU can accomplish outside Europe’s borders. And I find it important 
that all those who worry about the development of a world which we call unipolar, where only one big 
country decides the agenda, where only the US makes decisions over right and wrong, that they may realise 
that the EU should not develop as a counterweight or opposite pole to the US, but that we need more 
committed efforts, more committed voices, and that sometimes a strong EU will agree with the US, 
sometimes a strong EU will have an opposite view from the US, but the EU is needed to balance the US.
160 
As this paper has shown, her comment was no doubt typical for one of the most important 
driving forces behind the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy. 
 
                                                     
157  The European Convention, doc. CONV 685/03. 
158  Solana 2003, p. 40. 
159  Verhofstadt 2003, p. 35. 
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Figure 1. Number of EPC/CFSP statements issued 1970–1999 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of EPC/CFSP statements and number of states directly addressed 1970-1999 
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Figure 4. New states addressed in EPC/CFSP statements annually 
 
 
Figure 5. Geographical regions in EPC/CFSP statements 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
7
1
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
8
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
CEECs USSR/Russia and former Soviet republics
US/Canada Middle East + Arab world
Africa Asia
Latin America  – 38 – 
Figure 6. (Selected) themes appearing in EPC/CFSP statements 
 
 
Figure 7. References to actions (diplomatic and economic) in EPC/CFSP statements  
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